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THE NEW LAW GOVERNING
GENERAL PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
Sarah Mulkern*
INTRODUCTION

"The Will of God Will Never Lead You Where the Grace of God Cannot
Keep You," declares a sign over the front desk of Greenleaf Gardens, one of
Washington D.C:'s most infamous public housing projects. Whatever bucolic
images the name may invoke, the scene is anything but pastoral: the residents
are largely recipients of local or federal income assistance, the buildings
thoroughly dilapidated, and the atmosphere of despair seemingly complete.
Contrary to the sign in Greenleaf's reception area, whatever the feelings of the
Deity on this issue, it is surely the political will that dictates which public
benefits programs survive in the District of Columbia's worsening economic
times. On July 2, 1991, the City Council approved a measure that sharply
curtailed the number of people eligible for General Public Assistance (GPA).
Hundreds of GPA recipients have been removed from the rolls since then, and
thousands more. stand to follow. It is this terminated group, now without
income, that must place its faith in the grace invoked by Greenleaf's little sign.
General Public Assistance provided money to single, childless adults who
were deemed disabled or "incapacitated," meaning temporarily unable to hold
a job because of some new act, entitled the "Public Assistance Act of 1982
Budget Conformity Amendment Act of 1991,"' reduced the monthly benefit
amount for a single adult from $270 to $258 per month, the level used in
October 1989. The legislation also requires applicants to show that they are
"disabled" as defined by the federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
regulations.
The language of the old law provided that an applicant would be eligible if
he had a "physical or mental defect, illness, or impairment ...and must be of
such a debilitating nature as to reduce substantially or eliminate the ability of
the applicant or recipient to care for or support himself and be expected to last

Attorney, Neighborhood Legal Services, Washington, D.C.
1. 38 D.C. Reg. 4205 (1991).
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for a period of at least 30 days."2 The new law adds a section entitled
"Eligibility for General Public Assistance," which eliminates the use of the term
"incapacity," and states that "an individual shall be eligible for GPA benefits
only if the individual has a disability as defined in Section 542(b) of this act."'
That section also provides that a person will be deemed disabled if the
applicant meets the SSI standard for eligibility, which says, in part, that [a]n
individual shall be considered to be disabled ...if he is unable to engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to last for a continuous
4
period of not less than twelve months."
As the language of the new law makes apparent, the bar has been raised
significantly. Before July 1, 1991 applicants for GPA had only to show that
they would be unable to work or to properly care for themselves for a
minimum of one month; they must now show that for at least one year. In
practice, this means that even the most acute if relatively short-term health
crises will fall short of the new eligibility standard. Most new applicants for
GPA will be denied, and many current recipients will be terminated. Enter the
Gordian knot of administrative inconsistency.
Under the new law, the first termination notices sent to the "incapacitated"
were confusing and a reliable source of anguish for its hapless addressees.
These notices were also legally inadequate, failing to comply not only with
existing District of Columbia law, but, arguably, with long-settled principles of
due process. Entitled "Notice of Action," these notices stated that "[o]n (date),
your monthly public assistance will be terminated. The reason for this
termination is because based on the medical information you provided you
were not determined to be disabled. The District of Columbia manual citations
concerning these changes are: 3050."5 The notice also provides confusing
information about the appeal process. While one paragraph states an appeal
should be requested within 15 days of the notice, another states one may be
requested within 90 days, under varying circumstances. 6
The text of this notice is at least a violation of District of Columbia law
since it neither provides adequate notice of the reason for the action taken, nor
intelligible guidance as to how to file an appeal and possibly ensure the

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

D.C. Code I 3-205.42(B) (1981).
38 D.C. Reg. 4206-4207 (1991).
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(3)(A) (Supp. 1991).
Notice of Action sent to client, Oct. 10, 1991.
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continuation of benefits. The D.C. Code requires the Mayor to give "timely
and adequate notice in cases of intended action to discontinue." 7 The term
"adequate" is defined as:
[A] written notice including a statement of what action the Mayor intends
to take, the reasons for the intended action, the specific law and
regulations supporting the action, an explanation of the individual's right
to request a hearing and the circumstances under which assistance will be
continued if a hearing is requested.8
The termination notice under the new law cannot be considered adequate by
the District's own statute. It not only refers the recipient to a broad section of
the "manual" and provides conflicting information about the appeals procedure,
but the reason given for the determination is not detailed enough for a recipient
who wishes to challenge the decision to mount a knowledgeable defense.
A plausible argument can also be made that the lack of relevant information
in this termination notice also violates due process. The leading case ascribing
due process rights to welfare recipients is Goldberg v. Kelly.9 Justice Brennan
found that those receiving public assistance had a claim of entitlement
bestowed on them by the state statute that made them eligible for those
benefits, and, therefore, "when welfare is discontinued, only a pre-termination
evidentiary hearing provides the recipient with procedural due process.""0
After acknowledging the state's interest in keeping administrative costs to a
minimum, Justice Brennan agreed with the lower court below in quoting its
conclusion:
[Tihe stakes are simply too high for the welfare recipient, and the
possibility for honest error or irritable misjudgment too great, to allow
termination of aid without giving the recipient a chance, if he so desires,
to be fully informed of the case against him so that he may contest its
basis and produce evidence in rebuttalt

7. D.C. Code § 3-205.55(a)(2) (1981).
8. Id.
9. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
10. Id at 264.
11. Id at 266 (emphasis added).
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Clearly, it is at least arguable that these termination notices fall short of such
a standard.
In addition, many of these notices violate an existing District of Columbia
law that requires public assistance beneficiaries be given 60 days notice before
their benefits may be terminated or reduced. The relevant D.C. Code section
provides:
Sixty days prior to termination of the period of eligibility the Mayor shall
notify the client in writing advising him or her to submit a new medical
report and to request continuation of assistance within 30 days of the date
that the notice is mailed (postmarked), if he believes he is still eligible for
assistance."
The new law does not amend this provision of the Code. In 1982, a class of
District GPA recipients brought suit against former Mayor Marion Barry,
claiming that the city was "wrongfully terminating GPA-GU, Food Stamps, and
Medical Assistance benefits by failing to give the notice and hearing required
by law."13 United States District Court Judge June Green signed a Consent
Order permanently enjoining the District "from terminating GPA-GU recipients
without first giving each such recipient a 'Sixty (60) day- notice' as provided
by D.C. Code § 3-205.53(c) (1981) ed. as amended) and a 'Termination
Notice' as required by D.C. Code § 3-210.1 et. seq. (1981 ed. as amended)." 4
Under the new law, many recipients' termination letters are dated less than
60 days before the termination date; often the letters appear to be generated
four to five weeks before the date the person's GPA is to end. Moreover, the
new law dictates that a recipient who is being terminated may be reinstated
only if he "reapplies for benefits and is determined to have a disability as
defined in section 542(b) of this act."' 5 In practice, some GPA recipients who
have received termination notices have been reinstated without reapplying,
often on the basis of a request for continuation of assistance and an old medical
report.
The most striking amendment to this section appears at the end: "Benefits
shall not be continued beyond the effective date of termination if the sole basis

12.
13.
14.
15.

D.C. Code § 3-205.53(c) (1981).
Jones v. Barry, CA 82-419 (D.D.C. 1982).
Jones v. Ban-y, CA 82-419 (1982) (footnote omitted).
38 D.C. Reg. 4207 (1991).
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for the individual's appeal of the termination is the failure to meet the disability
standard defined in section 542 (D.C. Code § 3-205.42).N6 A similar notice
posted in the offices of the Department of Human Services describing the new
law says the agency will terminate and close the case of any recipient not
found to be "permanently and totally disabled" at the next review. The notice
ends by saying "[e]ven if you request a fair hearing on this action, your
benefits will not continue."17 On its face, this provision provides the strongest
basis for a challenge to the validity of the new law, contradicting existing
District of Columbia law, as well as case law that makes public assistance
benefits a protected property interest, requiring a pre-termination administrative
18
hearing.
There remains in the D.C. Code, a section which, provided a GPA recipient
makes a timely request, requires that benefits "not be discontinued, withheld,
(or) terminated . :. until . . . a decision is rendered by the Mayor after a
hearing and this decision upholds the Mayor in his or her action to alter the
amount or conditions of the public assistance grant." 9 This section confirms
the established right to process before a beneficiary may be deprived of this
acknowledged property interest. The thrust of the new law is to provide GPA
only to those who meet the federal SSI standard of disability; the District has
effectively exempted itself from hearing appeals from recipients who have been
found to fall short of that standard, although that determination may be
reversed with a hearing. Contrary to the provisions of the code, which require
in essence only a timely request for an appeal to be heard, many of the
presently "incapacitated" GPA recipients may be cut off without an opportunity
to challenge the action.
It should be noted that the lack of procedural safeguards in this instance is
doubly injurious to recipients. Even though the hearings are conducted by the
very agency that terminated the appellants' benefits, they may seek judicial
review of a administrative hearing decision unfavorable to them. In the absence
of such safeguards, the aphorism that "the poor are all too easily regulated""
seems all too true.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
(1965).

38 D.C. Reg. 4208 (1991).
'Notice to Adult GPA Customets' (undated).
See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266.
D.C. Code § 3-205.59 (d) (1981).
Reich, Individual Rtghts and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal lssuez, 74 YALE L.J. 1245
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In addition to the language requiring adequate notice, Goldberg also offered
a revolutionary analysis of government benefits, not only as a protected
property right requiring a pre-termination evidentiary hearing, but as "not a
mere charity, but as a means to 'promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.'' 1 This quote from the
Preamble to the Constitution must have been exhilarating for those who
scoured the document searching for a means to guarantee the basic necessities
of life for all citizens; the heart of the due process argument, however, is to be
found in Justice Brennan's comment that "termination of aid pending resolution
of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very
22
means by which to live-A.vhile he waits."
This is not to imply that all public benefits programs require an evidentiary
hearing before they are terminated. In Matthews v. Eldridge,3 the Court held
that the termination of federal Social Security benefits does not require a prior
evidentiary hearing. The Matthews court held that the administrative
procedures followed by the agency before the termination satisfied the strictures
of due process, and the consequences of the loss of disability benefits were
held to be less grave than the loss of a welfare check.
The Court used a three-part test to decide how much procedural protection
is required: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used; and (3) the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards, and the government's interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.2
In the main, however, the Supreme Court has deferred to the states in their
implementation of welfare programs. The Court has acknowledged that the
Constitution imposes certain procedural requirements on the administration of
public benefits, but it does not empower the Court to "second-guess state
officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public
welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients."2s While this

21.
22.
23.
24.

Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 265.
Id at 264.
424 U.S. 319 (1975).
Id. at 340.

25. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,487 (1970). For an interesting analysis of the "compelling"
state interest test applied to an equal protection challenge to eligibility for welfare benefits, see Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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deferential standard was enunciated in the context of an equal protection case,
the reasoning is analogous to that applied to a due process claim: unless the
states' administration of a public assistance program is abridging an
individual's right to due process, as revealed by the Matthews three-part test,
the Constitution will be satisfied.
Certainly an argument can be made that the present administration of the
District's GPA program invites the renewed application of both Goldberg and
the Jones consent order. Not only are these "welfare" benefits that are at stake,
but the administration of the appeals process denies recipients a meaningful and
timely opportunity to challenge the termination, as contemplated by Goldberg.
There are other important difficulties. Practical experience since the
implementation of the new law suggests that the Department of Human
Services has not always adhered to the federal SSI guidelines for determining
disability, as required by the new GPA law. Reviews of individual cases are
conducted by a Medical Review Team made up of doctors who examine the
medical reports submitted by GPA applicants or recipients, and who determine
whether a finding of disabled is warranted. As the new law has been in effect
only a short time, it is difficult to ascertain how precisely the SSI guidelines
are observed in making disability determinations.
An SSI evaluation of disability is a complex process, composed of fairly
detailed layers of analysis of a person's physical or mental impairment, as well
as age, education, and work experience.16 The SSI regulations have a 'listing
of impairments" appendix, which details, for each body system, the types of
disorders that would rise to the level of "disability' for purposes of awarding
benefits.' There is also a section known as "the grids," which match the age,
education, and previous work experience with a person's impairment to
determine whether that person is able to perform even the most sedentary
work. 8 At present, it is not clear how closely the medical review team
follows these regulations in determining physical disabilities, but it appears that
evaluations of psychiatric impairments are done without the participation of a
psychiatrist, as required by these regulations.
An obvious goal in making these changes to the law governing GPA is to
save the city money in difficult financial times. Withholding benefits from
those who may, in theory, be able to hold a job within one year is perhaps

26.- 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (1991).
27. 20 C.F.R. § 404. Subpt P, App. ! (1991).
28. 20.C..R. § 404, Subpt. P. App. 2 (1991).
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more palatable than terminating those who cannot work for a year or more,
although many GPA recipients have been receiving benefits far longer than 12
months. Across the country, general assistance programs are being terminated,
sharply reduced, or tied to "workfare" programs that require a recipient to
participate in state sponsored job or job-training programs to be eligible for
benefits. Unlike Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which is
subject to partial federal regulation, states have nearly complete discretion over
GPA programs. According to available data, 81 percent of all GPA recipients
nationally live in New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, California and
Illinois; of these states, Ohio, Michigan and Illinois have cut deeply their
general assistance programs, and California has legislation pending.29
An idea that is gaining popularity is to couple public benefits with a
requirement that recipients seek out preventive health care and make use of
job-placement programs. What is reported to be a growing middle-class
resentment of entitlement programs has led to an impulse to reform the
"behavior" that gives rise to the need for welfare benefits, whethei-o limit the
amount of time one may receive assistance, or to reduce benefits should a
recipient's child drop out of school, for example. This approach does not
dispute the need for benefits, but strives to reshape the public assistance system
from one of long-term support to a short-term safety net. This option beckons
those who wish to cut government spending without suddenly imposing
Dickensian poverty on erstwhile welfare recipients, and who believe in the
malleability of human nature.
There is another school of thought, one which, while perhaps not denying
the existence of poverty, challenges reports of its depth and breadth, as well as
its very nature. One Washington think tank, using curious indices in
challenging the latest Census Bureau report on poverty in America, asserts that
"[t]he poor are not hungry and undernourished; in fact poor adults are more
likely to be overweight than middle-class persons."" Poor Americans also
seem to compare favorably to Western Europeans in number of indoor toilets
in their homes. 3 The thrust of this argument is that entitlement programs have
inordinately increased the national well-being of public benefits recipients while
destroying the work ethic and creating an interminable cycle of dependence.

29. Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, "Memorandum to Welfare Specialists' (Aug. 5, 1991).
30. Robert Rector, 'Why the New Census Report Will Overstate Poverty,' Heritage Foundation
Executive Memorandum (Sept. 23, 1991).
31. ld
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Most who are of this opinion see cutting public assistance as the only way to
restore a recipient's sense of self-sufficiency. This group usually opposes big
government in all its forms, and discounts the externalities of racism and the
changing structure of the economy.

CONCLUSION

Both of these perspectives may have theoretical merit that would be of use
over time. Yet, they sidestep the most difficult element confronting the
practitioner: to face the people whose income is gone, with their food and
shelter soon to follow. Analyses of cycles of dependence do not help in
singular cases of need. The fact remains that we have decided as a group to
sustain people who are not, for whatever reason, sustaining themselves, and
have taken the further step of elevating those benefits to the level of a
protected property interest. Having made such an affirmative commitment,
perhaps we must bravely decide whether it is our need to save money, or the
end of our commitment, that has prompted these cuts in public assistance to so
many who may not survive without it.

